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This study examined the effect of a score card-based performance pay plan in a 
professional services firm.  The plan was implemented in response to a decreasing 
trend in productivity and a desire for a formal incentive compensation plan.  
Performance of manager and senior manager accountants were analyzed across two 
departments over a five year period.  A definitive account of the effects of the 
intervention is limited by the case-study design, but the data does suggest that the 
performance pay plans used did not adversely affect performances.  Design limitations 
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 The use of incentive compensation systems to motivate employees and influence 
performance is not a recent management innovation. Peach and Wren (1992) provided 
a history of incentive plans that spans centuries. Their analysis showed that the rise of 
the industrial revolution and emergence of factories increased demand for cost-effective 
ways to motivate workers to produce more. In response, piece-rate-pay was established 
in 1778 at firms such as Boulton and Watt, which used incentives to compensate 
workers in their engine works division. However, piece-rate pay systems slowly 
diminished in prevalence due to frequent abuses caused by the management practice 
of demanding ever higher piece-rate quotas for the same pay.  
Nevertheless, new trends in the global markets made employee monetary 
incentive plans a renewed possibility in the early 1980s, among other variable pay plans 
such as gain sharing, profit sharing and group incentives. As global competition 
increased and the annual productivity growth rate decreased in the United States, 
alternative pay systems were increasingly turned to in an attempt to increase worker 
productivity (Bucklin & Dickinson, 2001).  
Among the array of alternative forms of pay plans in business and industry, 
individual monetary incentives currently abound. Incentive compensation systems take 
various forms but an essential aspect is that the monetary incentives must be re-earned 
in each defined period (Kuhn &Yockey, 2003). “A survey of Fortune 1,000 companies 
conducted by Lawler et al. (1989) revealed that 87% had some type of individual 
monetary incentive plan for some of their employees, with 49% reporting coverage for 
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one to twenty percent of their total work force” (Dickinson & Gillette, 1993, p. 10). The 
organization wants to establish the tightest link between pay and performance when the 
company’s goal is to improve production. The best way to achieve this goal is to use 
monetary incentives (Bucklin & Dickinson, 2001).  
The introduction of hourly wages by Henry Ford made pay-for-time the 
compensation standard it is today (Abernathy, 2000). Yet, when an employee is salaried 
or paid by the hour, the amount of money received for employment-associated activities 
remains the same even if outside activities cut into work time (Dickinson & Gillette, 
1993). On the other hand, incentive-based pay can increase an employee’s productivity 
through increasing the employee’s proficiency on the job. Dickinson and Gillette (1993) 
stated that the amount and duration of work performed is the result of the 
consequences obtained for engaging in those actions compared to the consequences 
for engaging in non-work actions. While management has little direct control over the 
consequences for non-work actions, they can alter the consequences for work actions 
in many ways including via monetary incentives. 
By paying employees based on what they produce and the quality of the product, 
companies may see significant gains in item output and monetary profits. In a meta-
analytic review of 45 studies ranging from 1965 to 2000, Condly, Clark & Stolovitch 
(2003) analyzed the effects of incentive systems. The meta-analysis inclusion rules 
were: the research was empirical, the studies took place after 1960 and before 2000, 
baseline and intervention data were recorded and incentives were used to improve 
performance. The authors selected nine factors for analysis: location, type of incentive, 
competition, program duration, teams versus individuals, mental versus manual work, 
3 
type of study, quality versus quantity and motivation outcomes. The reviewers found 
that the use of monetary incentives produced an average performance increase of 22% 
across settings and tasks. 
Behavior analysts have conducted laboratory studies evaluating the effects of 
incentive pay systems on the performance of various kinds of simulated work tasks 
completed by adult humans (typically college students). Smoot and Duncan (1997) 
examined the effects of traditional hourly wages versus pay systems using three 
different levels of individual monetary incentives: positively accelerating, negatively 
accelerating and linear. The researchers discovered that all three types of individual 
monetary incentives increased productivity while hourly wages did not. Similarly, 
Matthews and Dickinson (2000) examined the effects of three different percentages of 
incentive pay (0%, 10% and 100%) on the time spent working compared to other 
available activities. The results confirmed that employees who received incentive pay 
demonstrated an increase in productive work time compared to employees who were 
paid as if they were salaried. 
According to a review by Bucklin and Dickinson (2001), several factors contribute 
to the effectiveness of individual monetary incentive systems: the employee’s 
performance is the basis for the incentives, behaviors are specified, incentives are 
assured (if the employee performs, the compensation will be received) and incentive 
pay is as immediate as possible. In well-designed incentive plans, employees know 
what is expected of them and how much progress they are making and pay is based on 
individual or collective performances rather than on the opinions of managers. 
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There has been considerable variation in organizational compensation systems, 
yielding different levels of success (Dixon, Hayes & Stack, 2003). Among the most 
complex and arguably most effective incentive plans are those that utilize a scorecard to 
tie pay to performance. Scorecards are collections of performance measures organized 
into a matrix, allowing computation of a score summarizing the aggregate level of 
performance during the time period used to collect the data.  
In 1986 the Objectives Matrix was introduced by Felix and Riggs, industrial 
engineers from the University of Oregon Productivity Center (Abernathy, 2000). Daniels 
(1989) integrated this concept within a scorecard that could be tied to a range of 
reinforcement systems. In 1990 Kaplan and Norton met with delegates from a dozen 
companies and developed the Balanced Scorecard which they publicly debuted in a 
1992 Harvard Business Review article. This was later refined in their 1996 book, The 
Balanced Scorecard: Translating Strategy into Action. Abernathy (2000) reported trying 
many kinds of measures systems in search of a measurement tool capable of providing 
a solid basis for tying pay to performance, before eventually adopting the scorecard 
format. The performance pay system analyzed in this thesis used scorecards that 
included elements of the Objectives Matrix and the Balanced Scorecard. 
Kaplan and Norton’s Balanced Scorecard is comprised of four distinct categories 
to which specific measures can be adapted: financial, customer, internal business 
processes and learning and growth. Measures in each of these four areas allow the 
company to objectively discern how well business units and individuals are performing 
in order to create external value for the customer and increase internal capabilities. 
Kaplan and Norton’s (1996) rationale for choosing the four measurement categories 
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was to encourage companies to expand their focus beyond only financial measures to 
include metrics that would help them maintain success over the long term. For example, 
the learning and growth category was designed to encourage tracking of employee 
development as well as strategic growth of the organization as a whole. Similarly, 
customer-oriented measures encourage companies to focus on doing the things that will 
keep their customers happy and doing business with them over the long term. 
Abernathy (2000) designed the Total Performance System, which is comprised of 
scorecards for measuring performance, effective performance management practices 
and profit-indexed incentive pay. The performance scorecard is the foundation of 
Abernathy’s Total Performance System and consists of four components: two to seven 
employee measures that ensure the organization’s objective evaluation of each 
employee’s improvement in key areas, a base (the current performance level), a 
performance goal and priority weights assigned to each measure. The Total 
Performance System also distributes a percentage of the company’s profit tied to each 
employee’s individual scorecard score via profit-indexed performance pay. The role of 
the manager in this system is to focus on strategic decision making and optimization of 
worker performance through performance troubleshooting and reinforcing employee 
behaviors necessary for achieving long term results.  
Continuous improvements, cost reductions and exceeding customer expectations 
must be the goal of every employee in order for a business to remain competitive 
(Kaplan & Norton, 2001). Most employees are not aware of their organization’s big 
picture and often wonder where their position fits in to the company’s mission as a 
whole. This leads to employees maintaining a limited scope of their job and not looking 
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beyond the immediate task (Malott, 2003). Present actions can be linked with future 
goals through a well-designed scorecard (Kaplan & Norton, 1996). Scorecard-based 
performance pay systems can unite the organization’s goals with the employee’s goals 
through directed measures and compensation for achieving results critical to the 
organization’s long-term success.  
 Several studies have evaluated the effectiveness of scorecard-based pay for 
performance systems. It should be noted that a major limitation to scorecard-based 
performance pay studies is the lack of experimental control (i.e. they are mainly 
controlled field studies or case studies; Dixon et al., 2003). Still, evidence from this 
research shows that scorecard-based incentive systems are effective in improving or 
sustaining employee and organization performance. 
Abernathy (2001) evaluated the effects of the Total Performance System on the 
productivity of 4,289 employees of 12 companies across 5 industries (manufacturing, 
retail, banking, publishing and distribution). In developing each organization’s Total 
Performance System, the companies first created a performance scorecard for the 
organization as a whole that depicted the businesses’ overall strategy and values. Then, 
performance scorecards were developed for each department in a cascading pattern 
from top to bottom (i.e. CEO to mailroom employees). Among the twelve companies, 
the performance scorecard was assigned to either teams, individuals or a combination 
of both depending on the organization’s structure and preference. The performance 
scorecards were then distributed to every employee on a monthly basis so they could 
track their own and their company’s performance. Summary data showed that average 
performance measures increased by over 33% across the 12 companies during the first 
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year. In addition, the data showed that performance improvement was greatest in 
organizations where the employees had the most direct influence over the scorecard 
measures.  
Porter (2002) analyzed the effects of a performance pay plan on measures of 
productivity among 78 employees across 3 departments in an accounting firm. These 
employees were staff and senior level from the tax, audit or accounting services 
departments. The previous compensation system consisted of annual payouts based on 
the employee’s productivity as measured by accumulated charge hours. Productivity 
had been decreasing under this plan so management decided to revise it. The modified 
performance-based pay system consisted of three components: base pay, objective 
bonus pay and subjective bonus pay. The base pay component was the employee’s 
salary which remained constant despite performance. The objective portion of the 
employee’s bonus pay began when an employee reached or exceeded 91% of their 
charge hour goal and was paid out two times a year. In addition, a subjective bonus 
based on how an employee was rated by management was paid out once a year. 
Productivity under the new system improved in two out of three departments, but the 
study also revealed that the new system seemed to encourage productivity 
improvements in the first half of the year, followed by reductions in productivity in the 
last half of the calendar year.  
Shelton (2005) extended Porter’s (2002) study by examining performance data 
under subsequent revisions to the pay plan in the same accounting firm. The baseline 
incentive system for Shelton’s study was the production only performance-based pay 
system implemented during Porter’s study. The compensation system evaluated by 
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Shelton was scorecard based and included a higher incentive pay opportunity. The 
scorecard had five components: Base, goal, weight, conversion scale and score and 
included five measures: participation in continuing education, professional development, 
employee’s available time to work, client satisfaction and production. These measures 
were weighted at 5%, 5%, 10%, 20% and 60% respectively. Production was weighted 
heavily due to the production-indexed component of the performance-based pay 
system. Employees who reached 91% of their production goal were eligible for an 
incentive payout. The incentive bonus was calculated as follows: the employee’s 
production was multiplied by his/her share of productivity, the result was multiplied by 
the scorecard score and the result was divided by 100. Incentive bonuses were paid 
twice a year.  
Data analyses showed that productivity levels remained near goal levels in both 
the baseline phase and in the revised pay plan, despite the fact that productivity was not 
the sole focus of the revised pay plan (which included other metrics in addition to 
productivity). Under the scorecard-based plan, scorecard scores improved or remained 
high throughout the 3 years they were in effect, suggesting that the system was 
effective in motivating improvements or continued high performance in areas included 
on the scorecards. However, some problems with the scorecard system were also 
noted. The staff accountants and senior accountants had little control over the amount 
of work available to them, and thus may not have been able to improve their productivity 
significantly. A version of the scorecard-based performance pay plan was also initiated 
for management-level employees in the same time period. Preliminary data analyzed by 
Morales, Hyten & Porter (2003) suggested that the more complicated management-
9 
level plan was having a positive effect on the firm as a whole, but no detailed analysis 
had been conducted that also examined individual performance. 
The current case-study evaluated data collected at the certified public accounting 
firm described above, over a five-year period from 2000 to 2004, and included data 
collected on 17 managers and senior managers in the audit and tax departments. The 
impact of the scorecard-based performance pay plan implemented for managers 
(excluding partners) extends previous research by Porter (2002) and Shelton (2005), 
who studied the effects of incentive pay arrangements on the performances of lower-
level employees of this firm. The performance pay plan in the current study was 
comprised of a base salary, subjective bonus payout, a percentage of the employee’s 
collections and an objective bonus payout based on the employee’s scorecard score 
and the profitability of the manager’s department. The plan shared many features with 
the Total Performance System developed by Abernathy (2000), including the use of 
scorecards indexed to profit; however, this company paid out bonus money annually 
rather than on the monthly schedule used by Abernathy. The inclusion of the subjective 
bonus plan also distinguished this company’s plan from that advocated by Abernathy. 
Nevertheless, a thorough analysis of performance data may be helpful in understanding 





 This study was conducted in a mid-sized regional certified public accounting firm 
in Dallas, Texas. The firm employed between 80-100 people across a number of 
departments. The audit, tax and accounting services departments were the three largest 
revenue-generating departments. This study concentrated on the performance of 
managers and senior managers in the two largest departments: audit and tax. All full-
time employees in both departments were salaried. The audit department’s services 
included financial services, operational and compliance audits, risk mitigation strategies 
and resolutions, performance measurement forecasts and projections, feasibility 
studies, Securities and Exchange Commission and other regulatory services, due 
diligence, internal control reviews, profit and inventory analyses and budgetary and 
cash flow analyses. Services of the tax department included entity selection; tax 
controversy services; corporate, partnership and individual tax planning; counseling and 
preparation; international, federal, state and multi-state tax services; sales tax, franchise 
tax and payroll tax services; wealth preservation, trust and personal financial planning 
services; retirement and estate planning; estate administration, including estate tax 
strategies; tax implications of transactions; representation before tax authorities and tax 
fraud. 
Participants 
 The audit and tax departments were structured into five tiers of employees: staff, 
senior, manager, senior manager and partner. The first tier, staff accountant, was the 
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entry-level position in the firm. These employees charged a low billing rate and were 
responsible for low-level accounting. Senior accountants, the second tier, had higher 
billing rates and more responsibility, along with some supervision over staff 
accountants. Manager and senior manager tier accountants were responsible for their 
own client projects (billable work) along with overseeing staff and senior accountants. 
Partners, the top tier of the firm, were responsible for bringing in new business, billing 
clients and overseeing the most complex accounts. Equity partners were also co-
owners of the firm (it is a Limited Liability partnership). The current study focused on the 
performance of manager and senior manager accountants. 
Procedure 
The Chief Financial Officer designed and implemented a new performance pay 
plan for the staff and senior accountant tiers of the accounting firm in 2000 in response 
to a decreasing trend in productivity at that job level. A plan was also developed for 
managers and senior managers so that the entire firm below the partner level would 
have a formal incentive compensation plan. Prior to implementation of this new plan, 
managers and senior managers were sometimes awarded end-of-year bonuses based 
on judgments by the partner group. There were no formal criteria for these discretionary 
bonuses and the amounts were fixed. Some managers received $3,000 and some 
senior managers received $5,000. No formal feedback accompanied this award. 
Archived data on the performance of individual managers from this time period were 




Performance Pay Plan Version 1 
This compensation system was in effect from 2000 – 2001. It consisted of a base 
salary, subjective bonus payout, a percentage of the manager’s collections and an 
objective bonus payout based partly on the manager’s scorecard score. Base salary is 
the amount of money an individual employee is guaranteed to make that year 
regardless of performance. Salaries for managers were negotiated at hiring and 
determined by the going market rate as well as individual qualifications. Throughout all 
performance pay plans, managers could continue to negotiate base salary raises as 
they had before. 
Scorecard 
The employee’s objective bonus payout was based partly on the employee’s 
scorecard score at the end of the year. The scorecard was created to ensure employee 
bonuses were tied to a mix of relevant performance measures across areas thought to 
be important to the short-term and long-term success of the firm. The scorecard was 
comprised of six components: measurement categories, metrics in each category, 
weights, conversion scale, base and goal performance and the score. Example 
scorecards and computations are shown in Appendix A.  
In the scorecards, the base represents a reference level for each measure 
(sometimes called a baseline, although it may not reflect an actual baseline level of 
performance). The goal represents the desired performance level for each measure. 
The conversion scale had thirteen intervals that ranged from -20 to 110, representing 
different levels of performance (110 being the highest level of performance). The 
conversion scale offered a standardizing mechanism so that measures with different 
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dimensions or different levels could be compared using a common scale. Scale 
intervals intersected with the line items in the scorecard (e.g., production) to produce a 
matrix of cells. A given level of performance on a particular measure was recorded in a 
cell, which yielded a conversion scale number for that cell. The weight given to each 
measure indicated its relative importance for the organization’s strategic thinking and 
focus and was also used in determining an employee’s scorecard score. The sum of the 
weights always equaled 100% (or 1.00). The score for each measure was calculated by 
determining the appropriate conversion scale score and then multiplying that score by 
the weight for that measure. Each of the scores were then summed to compute the 
employee’s total scorecard score. 
Version 1 scorecards consisted of four metrics for managers and five metrics for 
senior managers. These metrics were production, days in work in progress (WIP) and 
accounts receivable (AR; this measure tracked the average time to complete a client job 
from the beginning of work until the bill was paid by the client), realization, percent of 
budget and practice volume for senior managers. Production was the percentage of the 
goal amount of dollars accumulated through billable work. Work was billed in charge 
hours, which were then multiplied by the employee’s billing rate to convert time to a 
dollar value of the work. In the Version 1 plan, production was not capped on the 
scorecard, meaning that levels exceeding the 110% of goal would contribute more 
points to the score. This was not optimal, but was the result of a compromise decision 
by the executives in the firm. Realization was the percentage of billable dollars that 
were actually billed to the customer. The goal for the realization metric was 90%, 
meaning that writing off 10% of the work accumulated to a client account would be 
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acceptable. Realization is a kind of indirect quality measure in that efficient and effective 
use of time should result in a higher percentage of billed hours. Days in WIP/AR was an 
average count of the number of days elapsed from starting a job until the client payed 
the bill. Reducing this measure would improve cash flow for the firm. Percent of budget 
measured the year-end performance of each department relative to production goal 
levels (including staff accountants, senior accountants and all managers in that 
department). Practice volume was the dollar value of fees generated by accounts 
managed by senior managers and was designed to encourage senior managers to build 
their own books of business. 
The weights accorded each metric were different for managers and senior 
managers. In the Version 1 plan, the weights for managers were: Production 50%, days 
in WIP/AR 15%, realization 15% and percent of budget 20%. The weights for senior 
managers were: production 35%, days in WIP/AR 10%, realization 10%, percent of 
budget 30% and practice volume 15%. 
Objective bonus payout 
In the Version 1 plan, payouts were calculated using a formula that included 
some risk. This pay at-risk element used a base salary adjusted downward by a certain 
amount (10% for managers and 20% for senior managers) as the base to which bonus 
pay was added. This required that individual and department performance were high 
enough allowing employee’s to earn their salary back with an increased upside in 
potential gains. This system was designed so that managers could, given maximum 
performance, earn 25% of their base salary in bonus compensation; senior managers 
could earn up to 40% of their base salary. Payouts were indexed to department 
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profitability. Department profitability was measured as the net income of a specific 
department, taken as a percentage of the gross revenue of the department (yielding a 
profitability percentage). Department profitability percentages yielded profit modifiers via 
a sliding scale in an indexing table. This modifier was multiplied by the employee’s 
adjusted base salary to yield a bonus opportunity. The share of the bonus opportunity 
earned by the employee was determined by his/her scorecard score. In the example 
presented in Appendix A, the salary was reduced by 10% and then 10% of that adjusted 
salary ($6,750) was multiplied by the 1.75 modifier obtained from the indexing table 
based on the department’s target net income (profit). This yielded an earning 
opportunity ($11,812) of which the employee earned 93.5% (their scorecard score), 
yielding $11,044. That figure plus collections was added to the adjusted base salary for 
a total pay of $88,545. That payout was $13,545 above the base salary of $75,000 and 
represented an 18.1% incentive over base salary paid. This method of calculating 
bonus payouts is called profit indexing (Abernathy, 2000) and is intended to reward 
employee actions and results that lead to high scorecard scores and high department 
profitability.  
Collections 
Managers and senior managers could earn additional bonus money based on 
collections for their accounts (3% of the collected revenue). This was intended to 
encourage managers to follow up with clients to insure that outstanding bills were paid. 
Subjective Bonus 
The subjective bonus was an end-of-year payout based on partners’ ratings of 
the manager’s performance. The subjective bonus was created to monetarily reward 
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key performance dimensions not addressed in the objective portion of the compensation 
system. The survey for the subjective bonus payout consisted of ten dimensions: 
technical knowledge, non-technical knowledge, administrative compliance, performance 
on special projects, marketing efforts, client service, alignment with the firm’s mission, 
leadership skills and special recognition. Each dimension was then rated using a four-
point scale. The amount of money in the manager bonus pool was 1% of the firm’s net 
income before payments to the partner group. Monies were allocated to managers 
based on their subjective rating scores. 
In 2000, data were collected for 3 managers and 1 senior manager in the audit 
department and 3 managers and 2 senior managers in the tax department. In 2001 data 
were collected for 1 manager and 3 senior managers in the audit department and 1 
manager and 3 senior managers in the tax department. 
Performance Pay Plan Version 2a 
A revised plan was implemented for both managers and senior managers in the 
calendar year 2002. The plan included new scorecard designs and other changes (see 
Appendix A). The new scorecard included a new scheme for grouping measures into 
four categories: learning and growth, internal/operational, client service and financial. 
These categories were based on similar groupings of measures described by Kaplan 
and Norton (1996). 
The learning and growth category for managers and senior managers focused on 
professional development. The learning and growth metric was called employee 
success and was designed to measure how well the employees supervised by the 
managers and senior managers performed their jobs and developed their skills. 
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Employee success was comprised of five measures: percent of participation in firm 
activities, percent of available time to work, cross-training, percent mentee achieved 
goal and employee charge-hour goals reached. This measure was given a 15% weight 
on the manager scorecard and 10% on the senior manager scorecard.  
The internal/operational category focused on the internal operations of the firm 
and what the employee did to increase the efficiency of these operations. The 
internal/operational metric for managers and senior managers was the average number 
of days in work in progress plus accounts receivable (WIP/AR). This was weighted at 
15% for both manager levels.  
The financial category concentrated on measures that directly affected the firm’s 
revenues. These metrics were production and realization (weighted at 35% and 15% for 
managers and 35% and 15% for senior managers, respectively) and practice volume 
(weighted at 10% for both managers and senior managers).  
The last category, client satisfaction, was created to evaluate whether external 
clients were satisfied with the firm’s work. The client satisfaction metric was based on 
an annual client satisfaction survey completed by a sample of external clients. The 
results of this client satisfaction survey reflected general perceptions of the firm and 
were used as the client satisfaction metric (20% weight) on all scorecards.  
This version of the incentive system also capped the production measure so that 
110% of goal was the maximum allowable level. Capping was intended to balance the 
scorecard and encourage employees to improve their scores in other metrics in order to 
earn a higher scorecard score overall. The at-risk pay element of the Version 1 plan 
was eliminated in the Version 2a plan because it was seen as unnecessary. A new 
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indexing table was constructed, whereby department profitability was indexed to 
modifiers ranging from 4% to 28%. The manager’s base salary was simply multiplied by 
the modifier indexed to their department’s profitability to yield the earning opportunity. 
The manager’s scorecard score in percent was then multiplied by the earning 
opportunity to compute the bonus dollars to be paid out at the end of the year. 
Managers and senior managers could still receive bonus dollars from their collections 
and from the subjective pay system as described in the previous version of the plan. 
Data for the new plan were collected for 2 managers and 4 senior managers in the audit 
department and 2 managers and 4 senior managers in the tax department. 
Performance Pay Plan Version 2b 
This version of the incentive plan was in effect in 2003-2004 and differed from 
Version 2a in one way: the modifiers in the profit indexing table were adjusted. Two new 
bands were added to the profit indexing table to decrease the step size between 
different percentages of department profitability. Profit percentages of 52.2% and 57.5% 
were added, resulting in the increased incentive pay of two base pay modifiers of 6% 
and 10%, respectively. Appendix A illustrates this change. This change made it easier 
for managers to earn more bonus money because the plan was sensitive to smaller 
increases in department profitability. This adjustment was made because department 
profitability tended to remain at approximately 50%, and was harder to improve than 
initially anticipated. In 2003 data were collected for 2 managers and 3 senior managers 
in the audit department and 1 manager and 4 senior managers in the tax department. In 
2004 data were collected for 2 managers and 1 senior manager in the audit department 




Scorecard scores, days in WIP/AR, production and realization percent, percent 
employee success and practice volume were measured and compared from January 
2000 through December 2001 (Version 1 plan), January 2002 through December 2002 
(Version 2a plan) and January 2003 through December 2004 (Version 2b plan). The 
data are shown by department/level and on an individual employee basis by department 
(audit or tax) and level (manager or senior manager). Tables 1- 5 show the individual 
participant data displayed in Figures 1- 5. Figures show average measures by manager 
level in each department across years, as well as individual data by year. Employee 
numbers were assigned to protect the confidentiality of the participants.  
Scorecard Scores 
Figures 1a.1, 1b.1, 1c.1 and 1d.1 depict the average scorecard score per year for 
each department/level. Figures 1a.2, 1b.2, 1c.2 and 1d.2 show each individual 
employee scorecard score from 2000 to 2004. 
Audit Department Managers 
Figure 1a.1 shows that from 2000 to 2004 mean scorecard scores for audit 
department managers increased from 83 to 95, a 15% improvement overall. Figure 1a.2 
and Table 1a show the scorecard scores per year for each manager in the audit 
department. Employee 1’s scorecard score remained high during the employment 
period of 2002 to 2004. Employee 4 showed a 56% increase in scorecard scores, from 
55 in 2000 to 86 in 2001. Employee 5 earned a scorecard score of 96 in 2000, then was 
promoted to senior manager in 2001. From 2002 to 2004, Employee 13’s initial 
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scorecard score was 82, followed by 2 years of scores in the low 90s. Employee 14’s 
scorecard score was 98 in 2000, and in 2001 the employee was promoted to senior 
manager. In sum, audit managers who were in the position for more than one year 
showed improvement in scorecard scores. 
Audit Department Senior Managers 
In 2000 and 2001 the average scorecard scores for senior audit managers were 
79.5 in 2000 and 88 in 2001; however, scores decreased in 2002 under the Version 2a 
plan. Mean scores increased again under the Version 2b plan (although the perfect 
score in 2004 reflects data from the sole senior manager that year). Figure 1b.2 and 
Table 1b show the scorecard scores per year for each senior manager in the audit 
department. Two employees (5 and 14) had been managers in 2000 and each showed 
a lower scorecard score after being promoted to senior manager. The employees (12 
and 17) with the two lowest scorecard scores left the firm after one year.  
Tax Department Managers 
Figure 1c.1 shows mean scorecard scores for tax managers in the low 90s under 
the Version 1 plan, followed by a decrease under Version 2a and subsequent recovery 
under Version 2b. Managers with scorecard scores below 85 left the firm after only one 
year; two of those managers worked under the Version 2a plan. Those with scores 
above 85 remained with the firm or were promoted.  
Tax Department Senior Managers 
Mean scorecard scores for tax Department senior managers were generally 
below the scores of tax managers. The senior manager (8) with the lowest score left the 
firm after one year of employment. Those who had previously been managers (16 and 
21 
21) fared worse as senior managers, as judged by scorecard scores. The highest mean 
score was obtained in the second year under the Version 2b plan, but this was below 
the mean for the tax managers. 
Days in WIP/AR 
Figure 2 (a through d) and Table 2 shows data for days in WIP/AR. The graphs 
use an inverted scale of 200 to 0 days. Using this scale, a high bar on the graph means 
fewer days, which translates into better performance.  
Audit Department Managers 
This measure was weighted at a constant 15% across years for the managers. 
Figure 2a.1 shows that under the Version 1 plan, this measure did not approach goal 
levels. In 2002-2004 (Version 2a and 2b) this measure attained goal level once and was 
closer to goal than in 2000 and 2001. Figure 2a.2 and Table 2a show the days in 
WIP/AR per year for each manager in the audit department. Only Employee 1 regularly 
approached goal levels on this measure, although Employee 13 improved in the final 
two years (2003 and 2004).  
Audit Department Senior Managers 
The weight for this measure on the scorecard increased from 10% in plan 
Version 1 to 15% under Versions 2a and 2b for senior managers. Under the Version 2 
plans, means for this measure attained or exceeded goal levels. Individual performance 
was largely consistent with the mean performance levels.  
Tax Department Managers 
Figure 2c.1 shows that mean days in WIP/AR for managers in the tax department 
approached goal only in 2000; mean performance was far below goal for the remaining 
22 
years for this group. Individual data showed that performance approached goal levels 
only for managers 16 and 21 in 2000.  
Tax Department Senior Managers 
Figure 2d.1 shows that senior tax managers as a group approached goal levels 
more consistently across all plan versions than did the tax manager group. Mean 
performance was lowest in 2003, with three of four senior managers showing worse 
performance than in the previous year. Nevertheless, the performance of the tax senior 
managers was below that of audit senior managers on this measure for the last three 
years. 
Production 
Production was measured from 0% to 130%, with higher percentages indicating 
better performance in approaching goal levels for dollars of work potentially billable to 
the clients. Production percent is shown along the y-axis of the graph. Production of 
100% was considered goal performance; thus, production levels could and did exceed 
goal levels. Figures 3a.1, 3b.1, 3c.1 and 3d.1 depict the average production percent per 
year for each department/level. Figures 3a.2, 3b.2, 3c.2 and 3d.2 show each individual 
employee’s production percent. Production data were available from archived files for 
the 1999 year (under the old discretionary bonus plan prior to the Version 1 
performance pay plan) for Employee numbers 5, 7,14, 16, 21, 30 and 31; therefore, a 
comparison can be made between the effects of these very different pay plans on 




Audit Department Managers 
The mean production level in 1999 was 86.6% of goal, the lowest level observed 
for this group under any compensation plan. Mean production under the Version 1 
performance pay plan, weighted at 50% for managers, exceeded or was just below 
goal. The weight for production was reduced to 35% in subsequent scorecards, yet 
production levels approached or exceeded goal for this group.  
 Figure 3a.2 and Table 3a show production per year for each manager in the audit 
department. Two managers (5 and 14) improved their production levels substantially in 
2000, and they were both promoted to senior managers in 2001.  
Audit Department Senior Managers 
Figure 3b.1 shows that the 1999 production level for Employee 30 was 66.9% of 
goal, the lowest level seen among this group. In 2000, under the Version 1 performance 
pay plan, production increased to 86% and this person was promoted to partner the 
following year. Senior audit managers exceeded goal levels of production every year 
after 2000 with the exception of 2002. As shown in Figure 3b.2 and Table 3b, three new 
senior managers (6, 12 and 17, each hired from outside the firm) performed well below 
goal levels in their first year and these low numbers decreased the mean for 2002. 
Tax Department Managers 
Figure 3c.1 shows that the average production for managers in the tax 
department was 85.8% in 1999 and improved to 89% under the Version 1 performance 
pay plan in 2000. Thereafter, the average for tax managers approached or exceeded 
the goal production level every year.  
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Tax Department Senior Managers 
Figure 3d.1 shows that mean production levels for this group never exceeded the 
goal level, unlike the managers in the same department. Production levels changed little 
from 1999, though an increasing trend in average production appears in the last two 
years under the Version 2b plan. Figure 3d.2 and Table 3d show that the increasing 
trend in production per year occurred for Employees 7, 16 and 29 in the last two years. 
Employee 21, however, showed a steadily declining trend in production levels from 
2001-2004. Employee 8 produced the fewest production dollars in the first year of 
employment and was not retained thereafter. 
Realization 
Realization was measured on a scale of 0% to 100% with 100% indicating that all 
of the chargeable hours produced by the employee were billed to clients. The goal level 
was 90%. Realization was weighted at 15% for managers and 10% for senior 
managers. Realization data were available from archived files for the 1999 year (under 
the old discretionary bonus plan prior to the Version 1 performance pay plan) for 
Employees 5, 7, 14, 16, 21, 30 and 31. 
Audit Department Managers 
Figure 4a.1 shows that mean realization percentage was below goal in 1999 and 
under the Version 1 plan, but trended closer toward goal levels in the last two years. 
Improvement trends were also evident in the individual data for Employee 1 and 4, as 




Audit Department Senior Managers 
Senior manager 30 had 82% realization under the discretionary bonus plan in 
1999; in 2000 (under the Version 1 performance pay plan) realization increased to 88%, 
only 2% from goal level. Mean realization for this group attained or exceeded goal level 
from 2002 - 2004. The high realization for the group was from Employee 26 (97% in 
2004), whose realization had been increasing across three years of employment from a 
low of 68% (an improvement of 39 points). 
Tax Department Managers 
Figure 4c.1 shows that average realization for tax managers was below goal at 
88.5% in 1999. Mean realization percentages exceeded goal level in every year under 
the performance pay plans. The peak in the mean (98% in 2001) was due to Employee 
16 whose performance had been steadily improving across three years. 
Tax Department Senior Managers 
Figure 4d.1 shows that the lowest mean realization was 91% in 1999. Senior 
managers were the only employee group to start above goal in realization in 1999 under 
the old bonus program. Individual data show that this was due to Employee 31 who 
scored 94% realization in 1999. This employee was promoted to partner two years later. 
Senior managers continued to exceed goal levels under the performance pay plans with 
even higher mean realization levels. Realization for Employee 7 went from 88% in 1999 
to realizations 101% and 99% in the years 2002-2004, an increase of 11-13 points. 
Practice Volume 
Practice volume was measured from $0 to $400,000. This measure of the senior 
manager’s book of business was weighted at 15% on senior manager scorecards in the 
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Version 1 plan, and only 10% under Version 2a and 2b. Figures 5a.1 and 5b.1 depict 
the average practice volume dollar amount per year for the audit and tax senior 
managers. Figures 5a.2 and 5b.2 show each department’s individual employee practice 
volume dollar amount. This measure proved to be the most variable among employees 
and performance was so far below goal levels for most senior managers that the base 
levels on the scorecards (the performance level that yielded 0 scorecard points) was 
reduced from $100,000 in Version 1 to $50,000 in Version 2a and 2b so as not to 
penalize those with low numbers in this measure. This floor prevented negative points 
from accumulating in the scorecards. This decision was made because building a book 
of business proved to be harder for senior managers than thought originally, even 
though a large book was considered a prerequisite for becoming a partner. Only two 
senior managers (30 and 31) exceeded even $300,000 of business, and those 
employees were promoted to partner in 2001.  
Employee Success 
Employee success, the rollup index of several measures of staff accountant and 
senior accountant performance in the departments, was measured from 0% to 100%. 
This measure was only recorded on Version 2a and 2b scorecards and was weighted at 
15% for managers and 10% for senior managers. Figures 6a.1 and 6b.1 depict the 
employee success percent per year for each department. Employee success is a 
department level measurement; managers and senior managers received the same 
score on their scorecards for this measure. It can be seen that the employee success 
measure improved across the three years within each department. In the audit 
department, this measure attained goal level in 2004. 
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Firm-wide Measures 
 Figures 7, 8 and 9 show three measures reflecting outcomes at the level of the 
entire company. These measures are worth examining because they may be, in part, 
due to performance changes that occurred under the performance pay plans. These 
measures reflect the contribution of all departments and all levels of employees. It is 
important to note that performance pay plans with a different structure were in effect for 
senior accountants and staff accountants (described in Shelton, 2005). 
 Figure 7 shows the net income (before payments to the partner group) from 
1993-2005. This measure is a firm-wide profitability measure. Profits increased 
substantially in the years 2001-2005 over prior years. In terms of personnel, the firm 
actually became smaller from 2002-2005 (going from 99 FTE to 81 FTE) so the 
increase in profits was not a simple function of more professional staff. 
 Figure 8 shows firm-wide realization through 2005. Realization improved in 2000 
and remained above the 90% goal level thereafter. With high realization percentages, 
more work was billed to clients, increasing net income as shown in Figure 7. 
 Figure 9 shows average annual dollars paid out in bonuses to all professional 
staff (from senior accountants to senior managers). Payouts showed an increasing 
trend with large increases in 2004 and 2005. This timeframe includes a year (2005) not 
included in Figures 1-6. The Version 2b performance pay plan was in effect for 
managers and senior managers from 2003-2005, with its revised indexing table that 




 Two primary questions may be answered by the current data. First, did the plans 
improve performance and, second, were there differences in effects of the different plan 
types? Regarding the first question, a definitive account of the effects of intervention is 
limited by the case-study design. Even if additional baseline data (prior to 
implementation of the Version 1 plan) had been available, the AB research design limits 
interpretations. Large and consistent differences between measures from the baseline 
and any of the performance pay plan versions might have increased the ability to 
attribute changes to the plans; however, no such outcomes were observed.  
In addition, several potential confounding variables exist that preclude strong 
conclusions. For example, employee turnover (resulting in an ever-changing pool of 
people working under the plans, some new and some more experienced), practice or 
learning effects for multi-year incumbents, changing client bases, variations in the 
nature of work, other compensation plans in effect for other personnel or changes in 
policy or procedures within departments all may have contributed to the observed 
changes in performance.  
In addition only one year of true baseline data was available for only production 
and realization data at the level of the individual. The cumulative effect of these design 
limitations preclude drawing strong conclusions about the effects of the performance 
pay plans versus the previous discretionary bonus plans. Future investigations might 
use withdrawal, a multiple baseline or a group comparison design to isolate the effects 
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of the performance pay plans sufficiently to determine their effects relative to 
conventional compensation plans. 
 Although design factors limit interpretations of the current results, the firm-wide 
data showed that substantial improvements in company profitability were correlated with 
the implementation of the performance pay plans. These data are consistent with an 
effect of a plan designed to improve production and realization; performance metrics 
known to be drivers of profitability. Improvements in these two measures would result in 
increased revenue for the firm and, as long as costs were efficiently controlled or held 
constant, net profit measures would increase. 
Firm-wide realization data showed a sustained increase in realization percentage 
after the performance pay plans went into effect. In fact, the individual and group mean 
realization outcomes showed that this measure improved either immediately or across 
the years of the performance pay plans. Managers and senior managers were the only 
groups held accountable for realization as part of a performance pay plan (it was not a 
part of the staff and senior accountant performance pay plan). 
Production measures also showed improvements over 1999 levels for both 
departments by 2003-2004. Improvements in these performance metrics may have 
contributed to improved profitability of the firm. The chain of evidence is not complete 
though, because the performance of the partner group during these years was not 
analyzed and may also have contributed substantially to the firm’s overall improvement. 
Furthermore, the problem of attributing the improvements in company outcomes to 
improvements in performance measures is compounded by an inability to convincingly 
relate those performance improvements to the performance pay plans themselves.  
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 Do the data from the managers and senior managers reveal new information 
about scorecard-based performance pay plans in design or operation? There were few 
apparent differences between the Version 1 and Version 2 plans on the measures 
examined. It is true that the best performance levels across the measures were seen 
most often under the last plan (Version 2b); by 2004, five years after initial 
implementation and after several adjustments, performance across most measures was 
very high. But, in some cases performance measures had been trending upward for 
several years. It is possible that the later versions of the performance pay plan were 
superior to Version 1, but sequence effects also may have contributed to the observed 
improvements. In other words, Version 2 may have been more effective because 
Version 1 preceded it. A research design utilizing counterbalanced sequences might 
permit a better analysis of such potential order effects. Because changes in the pay 
plans were developed in response to changing organizational priorities, and were not 
implemented according to a research design, this comparison was not possible. 
 There were differences in the performances of the employees in the two 
departments, as well as between performances of the managers and the senior 
managers. The scores of audit managers, as a group, steadily improved more than any 
other group. The single highest scorecard score was produced within that same 
department by Audit Senior Manager 26. The tax department fared less well in many 
measures, and their senior managers produced the lowest average scorecard scores. 
Differences between departmental performance data may reflect differences in the 
nature of the work (i.e., conducting audits versus completing individual tax returns) or, 
because production data was the high-value data that was low for tax senior managers, 
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it may reflect differences within the departments in how chargeable work was allocated 
to different job levels. In any case, departmental differences suggest that performance 
pay plans need to account for unique properties or practices of different business units 
and either adjust the plans or department practices in order to assure the best fit 
between incentive plans and the contexts in which they are implemented. 
 In general, managers often had higher scorecard scores than senior managers. 
This may be due to the addition of the Practice Volume metric on the senior manager 
Scorecard. Under the Version 1 plan, performance on this metric was so poor that it 
subtracted points from scorecard totals for most senior managers. Under Version 2, 
performance remained so low that Practice Volume did not add points to the scorecard 
for most people (subtraction of points was blocked by the Version 2 design). A measure 
yielding a pattern like this across years indicates that it may be beyond the control of the 
performers or that performers don’t have the skill sets to affect it (Abernathy, 2000). In 
any case, steps should be taken to address the causes of the poor performance or the 
metric should not be included on the scorecard. 
 The Version 2 scorecards included the rollup employee success metric, a 
measure that improved substantially across its three years in effect. Because it was a 
subsidiary scorecard with 70% of its weight emphasizing production-related measures 
for the staff and senior accountants, this improvement may reflect improved production 
management by the managers and senior managers in each department. However, 
employees who were directly responsible for production in those departments were also 
operating under their own incentive pay plans (analyzed in Shelton, 2005) and, thus, it 
is difficult to attribute improvement to the actions of the managers and senior managers. 
32 
In addition, there is no direct evidence of specific steps taken by managers to promote 
performance improvement at the lower levels in their departments. Records of 
management actions were not produced, so it is not possible to link changes in 
managerial practices to the outcome data presented here.  
 The Version 2b plan also made it possible for managers and senior managers to 
earn more bonus money for smaller changes in department profitability. This may 
account for the firm-wide increase in average bonus dollars seen in Figure 9. This 
adjustment was made to increase payouts and thus attract and retain good employees 
in an industry where there is intense competition for professionals. It was deemed a 
reasonable change because no department had been able to improve its profitability (as 
measured by the particular net income metric) to projected levels. It is not clear whether 
that failure represented problems with the profitability metric, or with the failure of 
actions taken to improve department profitability.  
 The firm-wide data indicated that the company did well financially while the 
performance pay plans were in effect. Did individual employees fare so well? Bonus 
dollar data showed that employees earned increasing amounts of bonuses, especially 
while Version 2b plan was in effect. But the plans may have influenced employment 
decisions for people as well. Several instances in which new hires who performed 
poorly in their first year did not continue their employment with the firm suggest that the 
plans may have selected against low performers. It cannot be determined from the 
available records whether these employees resigned or were terminated by the firm. 
Those employees who performed poorly in their first year but remained with the firm 
showed improved performance. It may be that performance pay plans have complex 
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effects on hiring and retention decisions made by employers as well as employees. For 
this reason, it would have been desirable to have obtained opinions about the plans 
from the participants in this study.  
 Data from Shelton (2005) regarding the performance of staff and senior 
accountants (below the levels of the managers and senior managers) also showed high 
levels of production in the years between 2000-2004. Staff and senior accountants 
operated under two different performance pay plans, but both emphasized production 
heavily. These findings, together with the data in the present study, suggest that, at a 
minimum, the performance pay plans used in this firm did not adversely affect 
measured performances. It is possible that the plans were responsible for the high 
performance levels observed, but a definitive conclusion awaits further, more controlled 
analysis. Conducting such research in business settings is difficult given the many real-
world contingencies that impede the use of powerful experimental designs. Case 
studies of the type presented here may nevertheless be useful because they document 
how multiple aspects of performance change over time. Perhaps future researchers 
may look to these studies to assist in identifying useful measures and analytic methods 



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 9. Average practice volume per year for audit and tax senior managers. 
43 


















































































































































































s Desired Goal is 90% or higher
 
















2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Year



























Figure 14. Average total bonus paid to each employee per year.
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Table 1 
Scorecard Scores per Year for Each Audit and Tax Manager/Senior Manager 
1 4 5 13 14










5 6 12 14 17 26 30
2000 80
2001 91 94 81
2002 89 77 69 81
2003 89 85 84
2004 101
Year




11 16 19 20 21 24










7 8 16 21 29 31
2000 73 100
2001 72 64 75
2002 76 86 74 76
2003 67 92 67 77
2004 92 89 71 87
Year





Days in WIP/AR per Year for Each Audit and Tax Manager/Senior Manager 
1 4 5 13 14










5 6 12 14 17 26 30
2000 158
2001 89 155 165
2002 93 70 75 58
2003 100 57 103
2004 88
Employee #




11 16 19 20 21 24










7 8 16 21 29 31
2000 118 87
2001 129 43 114
2002 125 105 161 33
2003 182 90 174 135
2004 94 111 160 99






Production per Year for Each Audit and Tax Manager/Senior Manager 
1 4 5 13 14
1999 83% 90%










5 6 12 14 17 26 30
1999 67%
2000 86%
2001 126% 111% 143%
2002 111% 72% 80% 79%
2003 127% 93% 95%
2004 118%
Employee #




11 16 19 20 21 24
1999 95% 87%










7 8 16 21 29 31
1999 85% 87%
2000 85% 96%
2001 86% 66% 94%
2002 83% 87% 92% 63%
2003 91% 90% 90% 89%
2004 106% 92% 88% 93%
Year





Realization per Year for Each Audit and Tax Manager/Senior Manager 
1 4 5 13 14
1999 77% 85%










5 6 12 14 17 26 30
1999 82%
2000 88%
2001 83% 90% 68%
2002 87% 82% 97% 90%
2003 90% 87% 94%
2004 97%
Year




11 16 19 20 21 24
1999 91% 86%










7 8 16 21 29 31
1999 88% 94%
2000 98% 96%
2001 98% 87% 96%
2002 101% 84% 91% 91%
2003 101% 98% 90% 90%
2004 99% 88% 98% 97%
Year
Employee #




Practice Volume per Year for Each Audit and Tax Manager/Senior Manager 
5 6 12 14 17 26 30
2000 $300,176
2001 $11,581 $200,000 $25,000
2002 $3,867 $56,558 $87,990 $30,089
2003 $69,502 $41,054 $28,370
2004 $147,098





7 8 16 21 29 31
2000 $55,118 $340,356
2001 $41,500 $8,008 $34,784
2002 $45,249 $189,660 $74,449 $0
2003 $27,763 $161,347 $63,524 $0
2004 $40,957 $180,160 $70,147 $2,229
Employee #





Employees Working In Each Department/Level across Years 
Department Employee # 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
AUDIT 1 M M M
4 M M
5 M SM SM SM
6 SM SM
12 SM
13 M M M
14 M SM
17 SM
26 SM SM SM
30 SM
Audit Manager TOTAL each YR. 3 1 2 2 2
Audit Manager NEW per year N/A 0 2 0 0
Audit Manager SAME from last year N/A 1 0 2 2
Audit Senior Manager TOTAL each YR. 1 3 4 3 1
Audit Senior Manager NEW per year N/A 3 3 1 0
Audit Senior Manager SAME from last year N/A 0 1 2 1
Department Employee # 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
TAX 7 SM SM SM SM SM
8 SM
11 M
16 M M SM SM SM
19 M
20 M M
21 M SM SM SM SM
29 SM SM SM
31 SM
Tax Manager TOTAL YR. 2 1 2 1 1
Tax Manager NEW per year N/A 0 2 1 0
Tax Manager SAME from last year N/A 1 0 0 1
Tax Senior Manager TOTAL each YR. 2 3 4 4 4
Tax Senior Manager NEW per year N/A 2 2 0 0
Tax Senior Manager SAME from last year N/A 1 2 4 4
*Highlighted field denotes a Manager who was promoted to Senior Manager  
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APPENDIX 






Measures -20 -10 0 50 60 70 80 85 90 95 100 105 110 Weight Score
Production 40% 45% 50% 60% 70% 75% 80% 85% 90% 95% 100% 105% 110% 0.50 45.00
Days in WIP & A/R 240 180 165 150 135 120 110 105 100 95 90 85 75 0.15 12.00
Realization 50% 60% 65% 70% 73% 75% 80% 83% 85% 88% 90% 93% 95% 0.15 16.50
% Budget-Dept 40% 45% 50% 60% 70% 75% 80% 85% 90% 95% 100% 105% 110% 0.20 20.00
1.00
Score 93.50  
 
SENIOR MANAGER Base Goal
Measures -20 -10 0 50 60 70 80 85 90 95 100 105 110 Weight Score
Production 40% 45% 50% 60% 70% 75% 80% 85% 90% 95% 100% 105% 110% 0.35 31.50
Days in WIP & A/R 240 180 165 150 135 120 110 105 100 95 90 85 75 0.10 8.00
Realization 50% 60% 65% 70% 73% 75% 80% 83% 85% 88% 90% 93% 95% 0.10 11.00
% Budget-Dept 40% 45% 50% 60% 70% 75% 80% 85% 90% 95% 100% 105% 110% 0.30 30.00
Practice Volume $25K $75K $100k $150K $200K $250K $300K $325K $350K $375k $400K $425K $450K 0.15 15.00
1.00













Target Net Income $1,083,879  
Target Net IncomeTNI% of Gross Fees Modifier
































Salary Basis Modifier Score Payout Collections Total Pay ICP











Measures Level -20 -10 0 50 60 70 80 85 90 95 100 105 110 Weight Score
Learning & Growth
Employee Success Dept 40% 45% 50% 60% 70% 75% 80% 85% 90% 95% 100% 105% 110% 0.15 12.00
Internal / Operational
Days in WIP & A/R Ind 240 180 165 150 135 120 110 105 100 95 90 85 75 0.15 12.75
Client Service
External Client Service Firm 40% 45% 50% 60% 70% 75% 80% 83% 85% 88% 90% 92% 95% 0.20 19.00
Financial
Production Ind 40% 45% 50% 60% 70% 75% 80% 85% 90% 95% 100% 105% 110% 0.35 29.75
Realization Ind 40% 50% 60% 65% 70% 73% 75% 80% 85% 88% 90% 93% 95% 0.15 12.75
1.00
Score 86.25  
 
SENIOR MANAGER Base Goal
Measures Level -20 -10 0 50 60 70 80 85 90 95 100 105 110 Weight Score
Learning & Growth
Employee Success Dept 40% 45% 50% 60% 70% 75% 80% 85% 90% 95% 100% 105% 110% 0.10 8.00
Internal / Operational
Days in WIP & A/R Ind 240 180 165 150 135 120 110 105 100 95 90 85 75 0.15 13.50
Client Service
External Client Service Firm 40% 45% 50% 60% 70% 75% 80% 83% 85% 88% 90% 92% 95% 0.20 19.00
Financial
Production Ind 40% 45% 50% 60% 70% 75% 80% 85% 90% 95% 100% 105% 110% 0.35 36.75
Realization Ind 40% 50% 60% 65% 70% 73% 75% 80% 85% 88% 90% 93% 95% 0.15 15.00
Practice Volume Ind $50K $75K $100K $150K $200K $250K $300K $350K $400K $425K $450K 0.10 9.00
1.00
Score 101.25  
 
Base Pay $72,500





Total Collection $ $14,385
Bonus after Collections $19,388
Total Pay $91,888









Target Net Income Modifier






Target Net Income Modifier
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